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CASENOTES 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW - COEMPLOYEE LIABIL-
ITY - INJURED EMPLOYEES MAY NOT RECOVER DAMAGES 
FROM SUPERVISORS OR CORPORATE OFFICERS ABSENT 
THE BREACH OF A PERSONAL DUTY OF CARE. Athas v. Hill, 
300 Md. 133,476 A.2d 710 (1984). 
A busboy was injured at work when he was stabbed by a coem-
ployee. 1 The busboy filed for and received compensation2 under the 
Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act3 and then sued supervisory 
personnel retained by the corporate employer,4 arguing that his supervi-
sors had negligently failed to exercise due care in providing him with a 
safe workplace.s The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer. 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed.6 The court of ap-
peals affirmed, and held that the Maryland Workmen's Compensation 
Act did not authorize an action against supervisory employees or corpo-
rate officers for violation of the employer's nondelegable duties, because 
neither the supervisors nor the officers had assumed a personal duty of 
care toward the busboy by performing the corporate employer's nondele-
gable duties. 7 The court of appeals reasoned that the duties to provide a 
safe workplace and to retain only competent, nonviolent employees were 
not delegable to supervisory personnel and, therefore, the corporate em-
ployer was solely responsible for ensuring the performance of these 
duties. s 
Prior to the adoption of workmen's compensation legislation, com-
mon law rules of tort liability permitted an employee to sue his employer 
I. Athas v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 134, 476 A.2d 710, 711 (1984). The busboy and his 
assailant both worked at a Baltimore County country club on the date of the attack. 
[d. 
2. Athas v. Summit Country Club, No. A-607848 (Md. W.c.c. Dec. 31, 1974) (origi-
nal award of compensation by Maryland Workmen's Compensation Commission); 
see also Athas v. Summit Country Club, No. A-607848 (Md. W.c.c. Jan. 24, 1978) 
(order supplementing original award of compensation). 
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 37 (1985). 
4. In the same case, the busboy also sued his coemployee for assault and secured a 
judgment against him in the amount of $73,000 compensatory and $5,000 punitive 
damages. The case was in litigation in the trial and appellate courts of Maryland for 
nearly a decade. For a concise chronology of the procedural evolution of the case, 
see Athas v. Hill, 54 Md. App. 293, 295 n.3, 458 A.2d 859, 860-61 n.3 (1983), affd, 
300 Md. 133,476 A.2d 710 (1984). 
5. Athas v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 135,476 A.2d 710, 711 (1984). The busboy alleged that 
the supervisory personnel had notice of the coemployee's propensity for violence 
and had failed to provide the busboy with a warning. The busboy argued that be-
cause he had no reason to know of the coemployee's propensity, the supervisors had 
breached their duty to ensure worker safety by continuing to employ the violent 
individual. [d. 
6. Athas v. Hill, 54 Md. App. 293, 307,458 A.2d 859, 867 (1983), affd, 300 Md. 133, 
476 A.2d 710 (1984). 
7. Athas v. Hill, 300 Md. 133, 148-49,476 A.2d 710, 718 (1984). 
8. [d. at 149,476 A.2d at 718. 
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for injuries sustained in the course of employment. 9 The employee, how-
ever, was entitled to recovery only upon a showing that his injuries had 
resulted from the negligence of his employer. 1O Moreover, the em-
ployee's ability to recover was further limited by the requirement that he 
show his employer had violated a specific duty of care. II In addition, the 
employee was required to successfully overcome the common law de-
fenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow ser-
vant rule interposed by his employer.12 
9. See, e.g., Miller v. Western Maryland R.R., 105 Md. 30, 65 A. 635 (1907) (depen-
dents of decedent employee sued employer for negligence); Norfolk & W.R.R. v. 
Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 29 A. 994 (1894) (injured employee sued employer for negli-
gence); State ex rei. Hamelin v. Malster, 57 Md. 287 (1881) (dependents of decedent 
employee sued employer for negligence); M. PRESSMAN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION IN MARYLAND § 1.1 (2d ed. 1977); Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy 
Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641 
(1983). 
10. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, 
at 569 (W. Keeton ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON]. 
11. At common law the employer had a responsibility to discharge five specific duties in 
order to promote the safety of his employees. The five common law duties were: 
1) to provide a safe workplace; 
2) to provide safe equipment in the workplace; 
3) to warn employees about the existence of dangers of which the employees could 
not reasonably be expected to be aware; 
4) to provide a sufficient number of competent fellow employees; and 
5) to promulgate and enforce rules governing employee conduct for the purpose of 
enhancing safety. 
PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 80, at 569. Moreover, these five duties 
were considered to be nondelegable because the employer could not relieve himself 
of the responsibility for ensuring that they were carried out. Id. at 572. It should 
also be noted that these duties remain applicable in employer/employee relation-
ships that do not fall within the purview of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation 
Act. See Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. 214, 300 A.2d 665 (1973) (decedent found to be a 
"casual employee" within the meaning of the definition set forth in MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 101, § 21 (c)(4) (1985), thereby excepting the employee from inclusion 
under the Act and allowing his dependents to institute a common law action against 
his employer); Jarka Co. v. Ganci, 149 Md. 425, 131 A. 754 (1926) (injured steve-
dore could pursue a common law negligence action against his employer because he 
was excepted from coverage by the Workmen's Compensation Act by virtue of an 
exception for maritime employees). 
12. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 10, § 80, at 569. Dean Prosser dubbed the 
three common law defenses the "unholy trinity" because of their tendency to relieve 
the employer from liability for employee injuries sustained as a result of the em-
ployer's failure to discharge his common law duties. Id. The fellow servant rule 
was utilized to shield an employer from liability in situations where one employee 
was injured by the negligence of another. See Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 
253, 29 A. 994 (1894). The fellow servant rule provided that where an employee 
sued his employer for injuries suffered as a result of the negligence of a fellow em-
ployee, the injured employee had to prove that the fellow employee's negligence 
caused his injury and that their employer was also negligent either in hiring or re-
taining the fellow employee. Id. at 261-62, 29 A. at 995. The common law defenses 
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were also recognized in Maryland 
and were utilized by employers to defeat an injured employee's claim for damages. 
See, e.g., Miller v. Western Maryland R.R., 105 Md. 30, 65 A. 635 (1907) (defense 
of contributory negligence used to defeat recovery by. dependents of decedent em-
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Workmen's compensation legislation \3 was enacted to rectify 
problems that developed when traditional tort law negligence principles 
were used to determine employer liability.14 The onset of the industrial 
revolution spurred a dramatic increase in the number of employees work-
ing in manufacturing and manufacturing-related industries, which re-
sulted in a corresponding increase in the number of employment-related 
injuries. 15 Employees faced the protracted and expensive task of proving 
that their injuries had been caused by the negligence of their employers 
and not by a negligent act of their own. Employers, on the other hand, 
were potentially vulnerable to a multiplicity of actions and to large dam-
age awards. 16 
State legislatures adopted workmen's compensation as a solution, 
importing it from the German system of social insurance, which required 
both the employer and the employee to contribute monies to a state-ad-
ministered fund. 17 As enacted in the United States, however, workmen's 
compensation differed appreciably from the German system in that 
American laws required unilateral employer contribution. IS Workmen's 
compensation legislation was first enacted in the United States by the 
state of New York in 1910, and thereafter spread quickly across the 
nation. 19 
Maryland passed its Workmen's Compensation Act in 1914.20 "The 
[Workmen's Compensation Act21 ] embodies a comprehensive scheme to 
ployee); State ex reI. Hamelin v. Malster, 57 Md. 287 (1881) (defense of assumption 
of risk used to defeat recovery by dependents of decedent employee); see also I A. 
LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 4.30 (1983) (brief discussion of the 
genesis and evolution of the common law defenses). 
13. For a concise discussion of the history and theory underlying workmen's compensa-
tion, see I A. LARSON, supra note 12, §§ 1.00-5.30. 
14. See id. §§ 4.00-4.50; M. PRESSMAN, supra note 9, § 1.1. 
IS. See I A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 4.00. 
16. See M. PRESSMAN, supra note 9, § 1.1; cf I A. LARSON, supra note 12, §§ 4.00-5.20 
(positing that workmen's compensation legislation was occasioned by an increase in 
industrial injuries and a decrease in remedies available to injured employees). 
17. See I A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 5.\0. 
18. /d. 
19. [d. §§ 5.\0-.20. Larson views the form of workmen's compensation adopted in the 
United States as a private form of industrial insurance, as opposed to the "pure 
social insurance" systems adopted in Germany and Great Britain. [d. § 3.10. The 
form of compensation adopted in the United States was a radical departure from the 
status quo. Payment of compensation no longer turned on the issue of fault: the 
employer agreed to provide compensation regardless of whether employee negli-
gence had contributed to a specific employee's injuries. Moreover, the employee 
agreed to forego common law damage actions against his employer. See M. PRESS-
MAN, supra note 9, § 1.1. 
20. Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 800, 1914 Md. Laws 1429 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. \01). In 1902, Maryland passed legislation establishing a cooperative insurance 
fund for hazardous occupations. See Act of Apr. I, 1902, ch. 139, 1902 Md. Laws 
218 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. \02). The insurance fund legislation, how-
ever, was held unconstitutional. See Franklin v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 2 Balti-
more City Rep. 309 (Baito. City Ct. Common Pleas 1904). 
21. For a concise discussion of the history, purpose, and construction of the Maryland 
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withdraw all phases of extra-hazardous employments from private con-
troversy and to provide sure and certain relief for injured workmen 
.••• "22 As with all workmen's compensation legislation, Maryland's 
Act makes compensation the employee's exclusive remedy against his 
employer. 23 
The passage of workmen's compensation legislation created an equi-
librium between the competing interests of the injured employee and his 
employer. The injured employee received a guaranteed amount of income 
that was fixed by statute; his employer acquired the ability to stabilize 
costs and a statutory mechanism that precluded a multiplicity of suits.24 
Concessions, however, were extracted from each side. The employee 
agreed to forego common law tort actions against his employer in ex-
change for his employer's promise to compensate the injured employee 
regardless of fault and to relinquish utilization of the common law 
defenses. 25 
Negligence actions between coemployees are common. 26 At pres-
ent, however, the states are divided as to whether to extend the employ-
ers' privilege of immunity from tort actions to coemployees as well. 27 
Many states extend immunity to employers and to all coemployees who 
are engaged in the same line of employment.28 Several states, however, 
Workmen's Compensation Act, see M. PRESSMAN, supra note 9, §§ 1.1-.3 (2d ed. 
1977 & Supp. 1980). 
22. Athas v. Hill, 54 Md. App. 293, 297, 458 A.2d 859,862 (1983) (citing Continental 
Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md. App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176, cert. denied, 294 Md. 
652 (1982», ajJ'd, 300 Md. 133,476 A.2d 710 (1984). 
23. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985); see also id. preamble; Amchan, "Callous 
Disregard" for Employee Safety: The Exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation 
Remedy Against Employers, 34 LAB. L.J. 683, 684 (1983). 
24. M. PRESSMAN, supra note 9, § 1.1. 
25. Id; see supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
26. See, e.g., Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377, 438 S.W.2d 313 (1969) (coemployees may be 
liable as third party tort-feasors); Colarusso v. Mills, 99 R.I. 409, 208 A.2d 381 
(1965) (injured employee may collect workmen's compensation and sue a coem-
ployee); Wilson v. Hasvold, 86 S.D. 286, 194 N.W.2d 251 (1972) (same). For a 
discussion of third party actions, which include coemployee actions, under work-
men's compensation statutes, see Bernstein, Third Party Claims in Workers' Com-
pensation: A Proposal to Do More With Less, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 543, 544. 
27. Compare, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1985) (employers and coemployees im-
munefrom tort actions) and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-293a(West Supp. 1985) 
(same except that coemployees are not immune from suits for injuries caused by 
their wilfull or malicious acts or by their operations of motor vehicles) and GA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-9-11 (1982) (employers and coemployees immune from tort ac-
tions) and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44(a) (West Supp. 1985) (employers and 
coemployees immune from tort actions) with ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 (1976) 
(coemployees not immune from tort actions) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 
(West 1966 & Supp. 1985) (same) and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-4-38 (1978) 
(same) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 624 (1978) (same). A third immunity cate-
gory, which deals with contractors, is beyond the scope of this casenote. 
28. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 569·P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977) (statutory coemployee im-
munity provision excepts intentional torts); Edmundson v. Rivera, 169 Conn. 630, 
363 A.2d 1031 (1975) (statutory coemployee immunity provision excepts intentional 
torts and cases of negligence that involve operation of a motor vehicle); Williams v. 
162 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
limit immunity to employers only and permit the injured employee to 
pursue tort law remedies against his coemployees.29 
Recent actions affecting coemployee immunity have extended the 
cloak of immunity provided employers to cover co employees as well. 30 
A number of states have resisted complete capitulation and have, instead, 
adopted a moderate stance that permits coemployees to claim immunity 
for acts of negligence but not for intentional torts. 31 
A sizeable minority of states permits employees to sue coemployees 
under both negligence and intentional tort theories. 32 The unifying ra-
tionale underlying these decisions is that the ultimate loss from the inju-
rious transaction should fall upon the tort-feasor. 33 
Section 58 of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act34 pro-
vides an employee injured by the act of a third party with a choice of 
remedies. The injured employee may proceed against his employer to 
obtain compensation or, instead, sue the third party tort-feasor for dam-
ages. 35 If compensation is awarded, the employer may utilize the em-
ployee's cause of action to sue the third party, provided that any damages 
Byrd, 242 Ga. 80, 247 S.E.2d 874 (1978) (statutory coemployee immunity provi-
sion); Willes v. Grace Petroleum Corp., 671 P.2d 682 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983) (de-
fendant was not a coemployee under definition provided in statutory coemployee 
immunity provision); see also 2A A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 72.21 (indicating this 
to be the majority rule). 
29. See, e.g., Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377,438 S.W.2d 313 (1969) (coemployees may be 
liable as third party tort-feasors); Colarusso v. Mills, 99 R.l. 409, 208 A.2d 381 
(1965) (injured employee may collect workmen's compensation and sue a coem-
ployee); Wilson v. Hasvold, 86 S.D. 286, 194 N.W.2d 251 (1972) (same); Herbert v. 
Layman, 125 Vt. 481, 218 A.2d 706 (1966) (supervisory coemployee amenable to 
suit). For a list of jurisdictions that permit coemployee actions, see 2A A. LARSON, 
supra note 12, § 72.11, at 14-55 n.13.1. 
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1984) (employers and coemployees immune 
from tort actions); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-293a (West Supp. 1985) (same 
except that coemployees are not immune from suits for injuries caused by their 
wilfull or malicious acts or by their operations of motor vehicles); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 34-9-11 (1982) (employers and coemployees immune from tort actions); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44(a) (West Supp. 1985) (employers and coemployees immune 
from tort actions). For a list of jurisdictions that have abolished coemployee actions 
see 2A A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 72.21, at 14-73 n.23. 
31. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (West 1971 & Supp. 1986) (in addition to 
exception for intentional torts there is no immunity for torts committed by intoxi-
cated employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 440.11(1) (West 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1985). 
32. See Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 394 So. 2d 334 (Ala. 1980); Kilpa-
trick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 466 P.2d 18 (1970); Sylcox v. National Lead 
Co., 225 Mo. App. 543, 38 S.W.2d 497 (1931); Rehn v. Bingamen, 151 Neb. 196,36 
N.W.2d 856, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 806 (1949); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 
(1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (West 
1966 & Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-4-38 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 624 (1978). 
33. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 71.10. 
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1985). 
35. /d. If the employee is injured by the acts of his employer and a third party acting as 
joint tort-feasors, the employee may file for compensation against his employer and 
sue the third party for damages. Id. 
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in excess of the awarded compensation are paid to the injured em-
ployee. 36 Although third parties are amenable to suit under section 58, 
the choice of remedies provision prevents the employee from collecting 
twice for the same injury.37 
The first Maryland appellate decision38 to examine coemployee ame-
nability to an action for negligence, Hutzell v. Boyer,39 acknowledged 
that the Maryland Act precludes tort actions by an employee against his 
employer, but does not forbid an injured employee from suing a coem-
ployee.4o The Hutzell court bolstered its holding that coemployees were 
amenable to suit by noting that for fifty years the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act had not forbidden suits against coemployees.41 Decisions fol-
lowing Hutzell have refused to curtail an employee's right to prosecute 
tort actions against a coemployee.42 Neither Hutzell nor its progeny, 
however, discussed the issue of coemployee amenability to suit in terms 
of the third party provision43 of the Act. The language that rendered 
third parties amenable to suit44 was accepted at face value. 
The Act's operative third party amenability language states that an 
employee may file an action at law if he is injured by the tortious act of 
"some person other than the employer."45 In the lone appellate deci-
sion46 expressly construing this language, Schatz v. York Steak House 
36. !d. If the employer does not file suit against the third party within two months after 
the award of compensation, the employee may sue the third party. If the employee 
obtains a recovery from the third party, however, the employer must be reimbursed 
his outlays for compensation, medical or surgical costs, funeral expenses, disability 
or death payments, and vocational rehabilitation expenses. Id. 
37. M. PRESSMAN, supra note 9, § 6-2, at 530. 
38. At least one Maryland trial court previously held that a negligent coemployee was 
amenable to suit. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Hutter, Daily Record, March 13, 1943, 
at 5, col. I (Super. Ct. Balto. City [date of case omitted in Daily Record]). 
39. 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969). 
40. Id. at 232, 249 A.2d at 452. 
41. Id. at 233, 249 A.2d at 452. 
42. See Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop Servs., 289 Md. 204, 206, 424 A.2d 336, 337 (1981) 
(employer was not required to warn his driver that the company insurance policy 
did not indemnify the driver as to bodily injuries suffered by a coemployee); Connor 
v. Hauch, 50 Md. App. 217, 222, 437 A.2d 661, 664 (1981) (section 58 permitted 
Maryland residents, who sustained injury in an automobile accident in Delaware 
while on business, to prosecute a negligence action in Maryland against a coem-
ployee despite having received workmen's compensation payments under provisions 
of the Maryland Act), affd, 295 Md. 120, 453 A.2d 1207 (1983). 
43. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1985). 
44. Section 58 states: 
Where injury or death for which compensation is payable under this arti-
cle was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person 
other than the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the employee 
. . . may proceed either by law against that other person to recover dam-
ages or against the employer for compensation under this article, or in the 
case of joint tort-feasors against both .... 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1985) (emphasis added). 
45.Id. 
46. None of the cases cited supra in notes 39 and 42 turned on a construction of the 
amenability provision in section 58. See generally Leonard v. Sav-A-Stop Servs., 
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Systems, Inc., 47 the court of special appeals concluded that the definition 
of "third person" contained in the Act includes a coemployee of the in-
jured worker.48 
Prior to Athas v. Hill,49 Maryland courts had not decided whether 
supervisors and corporate officers, by virtue of their coemployee status, 
were amenable to suit by an injured employee. 50 Courts of other jurisdic-
tions have used varying approaches to resolve the issue of supervisor and 
corporate officer amenability. One approach used in coemployee negli-
gence actions embraces the common law concept of vice-principals. 5 I 
Any employee responsible for discharging one or more of the common 
law duties of his employer52 is classified a vice-principal and, as such, 
owes a personal duty of care to his coemployees.53 Courts using this 
approach have held that a vice-principal who neglig:!ntly discharges the 
common law duties of his employer is liable for breaching the personal 
duty of care owed to his coemployees.54 Supervisory personnel have been 
held liable under the vice-principal approach for the negligent failure to 
provide their coemployees with a safe place to work. 55 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin adopted a more widely utilized 
approach, 56 which allowed injured employees to sue supervisory person-
nel under the third party provision of the Wisconsin Workmen's Com-
289 Md. 204, 424 A.2d 336 (1981) (employer was not required to warn employee 
that its insurance policy did not indemnify employee against coemployee action for 
wrongful death); Hutzell v. Boyer, 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969) (Maryland 
law permitting coemployee tort actions was applicable to a negligence action arising 
out of an automobile accident that occurred in Maryland while two Maryland resi-
dents were returning from a Virginia job site); Connor v. Hauch, SO Md. App. 217, 
437 A.2d 661 (1981) (Maryland employees, injured in an automobile accident in 
Delaware, were not precluded by Maryland law from bringing a coemployee action 
in Maryland), affd, 295 Md. 120,453 A.2d 1207 (1983). 
47. 51 Md. App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982). 
48. Id. at 499, 444 A.2d at 1048. 
49. 300 Md. 133,476 A.2d 710 (1984). 
SO. The lone Maryland appellate decision involved an injured employee's action against 
a supervisory coemployee. The opinion involved the construction of a comprehen-
sive liability policy held by the employer, but did not reach the issue of supervisory 
coemployee amenability under article 101, section 58. See Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bierman, 266 Md. 420, 292 A.2d 674 (1972). 
51. See, e.g., Fraley v. Worthington, 385 F. Supp. 60S (D. Wyo. 1974) (Wyoming law 
applied) (supervisor could be held liable for breaching his employer's nondelegable 
duty to provide a safe workplace); Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1961) 
(same); Craven v. Oggero, 213 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 1973) (same). 
52. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
53. See Craven v. Oggero, 213 N.W.2d 678,682 (Iowa 1973); PROSSER AND KEETON, 
supra note 10, § 80, at 572. 
54. See, e.g., Fraley v. Worthington, 385 F. Supp. 60S, 609 (D. Wyo. 1974) (supervisor 
could be held liable for breaching his employer's nondelegable duty to provide a safe 
workplace); Ransom v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282, 288 (Alaska 1961) (same); Craven v. 
Oggero, 213 N. W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1973) (same). 
55. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
56. See, e.g., Neal v. Oliver, 246 Ark. 377,438 S.W.2d 313 (1969); Zurick Ins. Co. v. 
Scofi, 366 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. Dist: Ct. App.) (superseded by statutory amendment), 
cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979); State ex rei. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 
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pensation Act. 57 In order for recovery to occur under the Wisconsin 
approach, the supervisory coemployee must have breached a duty of care 
that he personally owed to the injured employee. 58 In addition, the in-
jury must have resulted from an affirmative act of negligence,59 and an 
act for which the corporate employer bears no responsibility.6o Because 
common law nondelegable duties are the exclusive province of the em-
ployer,61 a supervisor is not subject to liability for breaching a nondelega-
ble duty62 owed by the corporate employer to the injured employee. 
The Wisconsin approach63 is premised upon the assertion that the 
liability of a corporate officer or supervisor in a third party action must 
ensue from acts performed as a coemployee, rather than from acts per-
formed by an individual in his corporate capacity.64 Corporate supervi-
sory personnel owe their duty of supervision not to the employees, but to 
the corporate employer.65 Thus, in order to promote equilibrium be-
tween the policies underlying workmen's compensation66 and arguments 
that support suit by the worker to recover for injuries caused by a super-
visor's negligence,67 the Wisconsin approach distinguishes between non-
S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (en banc); Steele v. Eaton, 130 Vt. 1,285 A.2d 749 
(1971). 
57. See, e.g., Lupovici v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 79 Wis. 2d 491, 255 N.W.2d 590 
(1977); Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis. 2d 615,201 N.W.2d 52 (1972); Zimmerman v. 
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968). Judicial con-
struction of the third party provision of the Wisconsin Act was subsequently super-
seded by legislative amendment. See Act of Jan. 1, 1978, ch. 195, § 2, 1977 Wis. 
Laws (conferring immunity from suit on coemployees) (codified at WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 102.03(2) (West Supp. 1985». 
58. See Lupovici v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 79 Wis. 2d 491, 255 N.W.2d 590 (1977). 
59. See Laffin v. Chemical Supply Co., 77 Wis. 2d 353, 253 N.W.2d 51 (1977). The 
design and installation of a bulk storage system for sulfuric acid was held not to be 
an affirmative act that exceeded the employer's nondelegable duty to furnish a safe 
workplace; accordingly, the superintendent who had designed and installed the sys-
tem had not committed an affirmative act of negligence which would render him 
personally liable to an employee injured in an explosion of apparatus connected to 
the system. /d. at 361, 253 N.W.2d at 54. 
60. See Kranig v. Richer, 98 Wis. 2d 438, 297 N.W.2d 26 (1980). The corporate presi-
dent in Kranig was discharging his nondelegable duties of supervision and of provid-
ing suitable equipment when his employee was injured; therefore, the issue of the 
president's negligence was immaterial, because he was acting in his capacity as an 
employer. The injured employee's sole recourse lay with workmen's compensation. 
Id. at 442-43, 297 N.W.2d at 28. 
61. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
62. [d. 
63. The paradigm used by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was dubbed the "Wiscon-
sin" approach by the Maryland court of special appeals. Athas v. Hill, 54 Md. App. 
293, 305,458 A.2d 859, 866 (1983), ajJ'd, 300 Md. 133,476 A.2d 710 (1984). 
64. Kruse v. Schieve, 61 Wis. 2d 421, 426-27, 213 N.W.2d 64, 67-68 (1973). 
65. See Laffin v. Chemical Supply Co., 77 Wis. 2d 353,359,253 N.W.2d 51,53 (1977) 
(citing Kruse v. Schieve, 61 Wis. 2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973». 
66. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 12, § 2.20. 
67. See, e.g., Fraley v. Worthington, 385 F. Supp. 605 (D. Wyo. 1974) (holding that a 
supervisory coemployee is amenable to suit for failing to fulfill his employer's com-
mon law duty to provide a safe workplace was based on the fundamental tort law 
theory that the tort-feasor should be liable for the harm caused by his acts); Ransom 
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delegable duties, which are owed by the employer, and personal duties 
owed by the individual supervisors.68 An employee injured by the breach 
of a nondelegable duty takes his remedy solely from the compensation 
mandated by the Act.69 In comparison, an employee injured by the 
breach of a personal duty may receive compensation under the Act and 
may also elect to proceed against the supervisory coemployee for 
damages.7o 
In Athas v. Hill,?! the plaintiff sued supervisory coemployees for 
negligently failing to provide a safe place to work.72 Hence, the issue of 
first impression presented to the Court of Appeals of Maryland did not 
focus exclusively on coemployee amenability to suit; rather, it focused on 
whether an employee could seek recovery under the provisions of article 
101, section 58 against supervisory co employees for negligently discharg-
ing common law duties owed the employee by the corporate employer.73 
The court held that Maryland's Act did not authorize the plaintiff to 
maintain an action against supervisory coemployees for negligently dis-
charging the common law duties of the employer, because those duties 
were nondelegable in the sense that the supervisory employees who per-
formed them "did not thereby assume a personal duty of care toward the 
plaintiff. "74 
The court of appeals based its decision upon Maryland cases,75 de-
cided prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act, that 
held employers liable for the negligent discharge of nondelegable duties 
by their supervisory personnel and upon the dichotomy between personal 
and nondelegable duties espoused in the Wisconsin approach.76 Despite 
the court's conclusions that the term "coemployees" includes supervi-
sors77 and that provisions of the Act permit coemployee actions,78 the 
v. Haner, 362 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1961) (holding that supervisory coemployees are 
amenable to suit for breach of their employer's duty to provide a safe workplace was 
based on the assertion that employees are entitled to rely on their supervisors to 
perform the employer's duties in a nonnegligent fashion). 
68. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has analogized the distinction as follows: third 
party actions against corporate officers and supervisors are permitted only "when 
such officer [or supervisor] has doffed the cap of corporate officer [or supervisor], 
and donned the cap of a coemployee." Kruse v. Schieve, 61 Wis. 2d 421, 425,213 
N.W.2d 64, 66 (1973). 
69. See Kranig v. Richer, 98 Wis. 2d 438, 297 N.W.2d 26 (1980); Crawford v. Dick-
man, 72 Wis. 2d 151,240 N.W.2d 165 (1976). 
70. See Laffin v. Chemical Supply Co., 77 Wis. 2d 353, 253 N.W.2d 51 (1977); Wasley 
v. Kosmatka, 50 Wis. 2d 738, 184 N.W.2d 821 (1971). 
71. 300 Md. 133,476 A.2d 710 (1984). 
72. [d. at 135, 476 A.2d at 711. 
73. [d. at 148-49,476 A.2d at 718. 
74. [d. at 148, 476 A.2d at 718. 
75. See, e.g., Chesapeake Stevedoring Co. v. Hufnagel, 120 Md. 53, 87 A. 4 (1913); 
Frizzell v. Sullivan, 117 Md. 388, 83 A. 651 (1912); Norfolk & W.R.R. v. Hoover, 
79 Md. 253, 29 A. 994 (1894). 
76. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. 
77. Athas, 300 Md. at 148,476 A.2d at 718. 
78. [d. 
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claim in Athas was disallowed. The dispositive finding was that under 
the common law of Maryland employers cannot delegate to their super-
visory personnel the duties to provide a safe workplace and to retain only 
competent, nonviolent employees.79 Hence, the court applied the Wis-
consin approach in light of this finding and determined that the supervi-
sors in Athas did not breach a personal duty of care that they owed to the 
plaintiff. 80 
Although Athas leaves Maryland aligned with the minority of juris-
dictions that permit coemployee actions,81 the holding clearly limits the 
class of potential coemployee defendants by excepting supervisors and 
corporate officers who discharge their employers' nondelegable duties82 
from reach of the third party amenability provision. 83 As a result of 
Athas, corporate officers and supervisors are amenable to coemployee 
suits only for the violation of a personal duty of care that they owed to 
another employee.84 
Athas v. Hill is best evaluated as a judicial attempt to create equilib-
rium among policies underlying the third party amenability provision of 
section 5885 and the entirety of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation 
Act. 86 The Act was intended to provide the injured employee with a 
stable income during his recuperative period, to relieve his employer of 
the expense of defending the increased number of actions that resulted 
from the onset of industrialization, and to alleviate taxpayer expenses 
associated with maintenance of courts and juries and provision of sup-
port for injured employees and their dependents,87 Subsequently, the 
legislature amended section 58, permitting injured employees to collect 
compensation and also to sue third.parties who may have caused their 
injuries. 88 The amendment provided injured employees with more com-
plete relief, because it enabled them to seek damages from the third par-
79. [d. Using the analogy proposed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, the Athas 
court reasoned that the country club supervisors never "doffed the cap" of corpo-
rate officer, because they were performing the common law nondelegable duties of 
their employer. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
80. Athas, 300 Md. at 149-50,476 A.2d at 718-19. 
81. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
82. Athas, 300 Md. at 148-49,476 A.2d at 718. 
83. Parties who fit within the class of "some person other than the employer" are ame-
nable to suit under the third party provision of the Act. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 
101, § 58 (1985). 
84. Athas, 300 Md. at 149,476 A.2d at 718. 
85. Although there is a dearth of Maryland legislative history regarding the passage of 
its third party amenability provision, Professor Larson asserts that third party pro-
visions generally were intended to fix liability on the true tort-feasor, to make the 
injured worker whole, and to reimburse the employer for his compensation pay-
ment. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 12, §§ 71.00-.20, at 14-1 to -8. 
86. See Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 800, preamble, 1914 Md. Laws 1429 (codified at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 101). 
87. [d. 
88. Act of Apr. 9, 1920, ch. 456, § 58, 1920 Md. Laws 763 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 101). 
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ties that were greater than the amount of compensation available to them 
under the original statute. 
The Athas court sagaciously recognized, however, that permitting 
corporate officers and supervisors to be held liable for failure to maintain 
a safe workplace would impede efficient business and industrial manage-
ment and occasion results injurious to the interests of employers. A 
holding that provided the broadest possible interpretation of the third 
party amenability provision, thereby rendering supervisors and corporate 
officers liable for breach of their employers' common law duties, would 
likely force employers to provide liability insurance to such employees89 
in order to maintain an efficient level of operation and assure them that 
they would not risk unlimited liability merely by performing certain 
types of supervisory chores. Provision of indemnification, a result that is 
not countenanced by the Act,90 would impose substantial additional 
costs upon many Maryland employers, would tend to discourage large 
businesses and industrial concerns from expanding or relocating in 
Maryland, and would emasculate the employer immunity provisions of 
the Act.9) Moreover, Maryland employees currently receive protection 
from hazardous working conditions under both common law92 and statu-
tory law,93 which require employers to maintain safe, sanitary work-
places. Hence, permitting supervisory coemployees to be held liable for 
violating their employers' duty to maintain safe workplaces would con-
travene common law precedent and the intent of the legislature, which 
was to hold employers liable for breach of this duty.94 
89. See State ex reI. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). The 
Badami Court reasoned that imposing personal liability on supervisors and corpo-
rate officers for failure to maintain a safe workplace would require employers to 
purchase indemnification for such employees; a result that would vitiate the immu-
nity provisions of workmen's compensation law. [d. at 180. 
90. Under the Act, employers' responsibility regarding compensation is limited to pay-
ing, or securing insurance to pay, compensation for the accidental death or disabil-
ity of their employees. Compensation is payable pursuant to rate schedules 
provided in the Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1985). 
91. [d. Payment of compensation is the extent of an employer's liability if he secures 
payment as mandated by section 15. 
92. See supra note 11. 
93. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 32 (1985). 
94. Although the Athas court avoided an express interpretation of the third party ame-
nability provision ("some person other than the employer"), it did construe the pro-
vision as excluding supervisors and corporate officers who perform the common law 
nondelegable duties of their employers. 300 Md. at 148, 476 A.2d at 718. The 
Athas court noted that the acts of supervisors and corporate officers performing the 
corporate employer's nondelegable duties cannot be severed from the corporation. 
300 Md. at 149, 476 A.2d at 718. Hence, in cases that involve factual scenarios 
similar to that found in Athas, liability is not created in "some person other than the 
[corporate] employer." The court's construction of the third party amenability pro-
vision is buttressed by statutory construction rules set out in cases that address is-
sues of workmen's compensation law. See, e.g., Ryder Truck v. Kennedy, 296 Md. 
528, 463 A.2d 850 (1983) (statutory construction turns on legislative intent as 
gleaned from the statutory language at issue); Soper v. Montgomery County, 294 
Md. 331,449 A.2d 1158 (1982) (statutes are to be construed reasonably and in light 
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The legislature has mandated that the Act is to be "interpreted and 
construed as to effectuate its general purpose."95 The Act was passed to 
provide injured employees with an income while they are unable to work, 
to stabilize employer outlays, and to alleviate the pecuniary burden of 
public assistance shouldered by taxpayers prior to its adoption.96 The 
court's holding in Athas is consistent with the legislature's "general pur-
pose" mandate. Injured employees will continue to receive compensa-
tion regardless of fault, while employer and taxpayer97 costs will remain 
static. Moreover, the injured employee's right to sue third parties has 
not been substantially vitiated by the court's holding; the employee re-
tains the ability to sue all third party tort-feasors except supervisors and 
corporate officers who are charged with performing nondelegable 
duties.98 
Although the court utilized the concept of common law nondelega-
ble duties as a bright-line test to preclude liability,99 the effect of the test 
is mitigated by subsequent language contained in the opinion. The court 
specifically stated that commission of affirmative, direct acts of negli-
gence would render supervisors and corporate officers amenable to suit 
under section 58. 100 In addition, the court included a caveat that limited 
its holding to cases that involve substantially similar fact patterns. lOl 
Hence, it is clear that supervisors and corporate officers will be held ame-
nable to suit for the breach of a personal duty that causes injury to their 
coemployees. 102 
of the purpose to be accomplished). But see Howard County Ass'n for Retarded 
Citizens v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 418 A.2d 1210 (1980) (Maryland's Workmen's 
Compensation Act should be construed in the most liberal manner possible under 
its provisions in favor of the injured employee); Wiley Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. 
200,373 A.2d 613 (1977) (same). Legislative intent, as embodied in the plain lan-
guage of the third party amenability provision, mandates that officers and supervi-
sors performing the nondelegable duties of their employers be excluded from the 
reach of section 58, because liability for the negligent performance of such duties is 
placed on the employer. The Athas court provides a reasonable construction of the 
third party provision: one that balances competing interests of the employee and 
the employer. Moreover, the court's construction is consistent with the purposes 
that compelled the initial passage of the Act. See Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 800, 
preamble, 1914 Md. Laws 1429 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 101). 
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 63 (1985). 
96. See Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 800, preamble, 1914 Md. Laws 1429 (codified at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 101); supra text accompanying note 87. 
97. Although it would appear at first blush that Maryland taxpayers have reason to 
complain about the Athas decision because injured employees and their dependents 
are precluded from suing supervisors who negligently discharge nondelegable du-
ties, this is not the case. The frequency of actions against supervisory coemployees is 
quite low; therefore, few employees will be forced to rely on public funds to supple-
ment their compensation awards or to support their families when compensation 
terminates. 
98. See Athas, 300 Md. at 148-50, 476 A.2d at 718. 
99. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
100. Athas, 300 Md. at 149,476 A.2d at 718. 
101. Id. at 150,476 A.2d at 719. 
102. The Athas court adopted the "Wisconsin" approach to determine liability of super-
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The Athas decision is a common sense compromise between the 
rights of an injured employee and his employer and, as such, is com-
mendable. First, the court did not act to abolish an existing right of ac-
tion; it merely held that the right to pursue recovery against supervisory 
co employees or corporate officers depends upon whether a personal duty 
of care was owed the employee. \03 Second, the degree of dangerousness 
of the employee's work environment is not exacerbated by the court's 
holding. Employers will continue to act in a manner consistent with pro-
tecting their pecuniary interests lO4 and, therefore, will take measures nec-
essary to ensure that their employees have safe places to work. Third, 
the decision is consistent with the legislature's "general purpose" man-
date contained in the Act, \05 and it benefits both employers and 
employees. 106 
As a result of Athas, coemployee actions against supervisory person-
nel or corporate officers under the amenability provision of section 58 
must be premised upon the breach of a personal duty of care that was 
owed by the supervisor or officer to the injured employee. Moreover, the 
court's holding has not substantially narrowed the amenability provision, 
and the legislature has not acted to amend the provision since the court 
held that co employees are amenable to suit in Hutzell v. Boyer. \07 It is 
therefore unlikely that the legislature will alter either the limited immu-
nity provided supervisors and corporate officers by the Athas decision or 
the third party amenability provision of section 58. 
Michael L. Jennings 
visory coemployees and corporate officers under section 58. Id. at 148,476 A.2d at 
718; see supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text. 
103. Athas, 300 Md. at 134,476 A.2d at 711. 
104. Under section 16, employers have an election of compensation methods. Whether 
the employer chooses insurance or direct payment to the injured employee, he will 
attempt to mitigate the cost of premiums or the likelihood of payment. MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 101, § 16 (1985). 
105. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
106. The Athas holding maintains the "bargain" struck between employers and employ-
ees by the passage of workmen's compensation acts. Employers' costs remain static, 
and employees are permitted to prosecute tort actions against all coemployees ex-
cept supervisors and corporate officers performing the nondelegable duties of their 
employers. 
107. 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969). 
